Keep participation lists private while voting is open.
I want identifiable lists of who has or has not returned a ballot kept out of the hands of campaigns and the general public while voting is still open.
A voter should still be able to check their own ballot's status. Election officials must retain the access they need to process ballots, contact voters, and resolve signature or other ballot issues. Aggregate turnout and processing counts should remain available to the public.
The distinction is between understanding how an election is progressing and tracking an individual voter's participation while that person can still be targeted. I support public access to these participation lists after voting closes, subject to other legal privacy protections.
Washington law currently allows any political party, committee, or person to request lists of registered voters who have or have not voted. I am advocating a change to that law for the period when voting remains open.
Test signature security against new threats.
I am concerned that AI could reproduce a person's signature with convincing variations, challenging systems that rely on signature comparison. Whether those imitations would pass actual ballot verification needs independent testing.
Election safeguards should be tested against realistic attempts at imitation. Publish the methods and results, including how often the system accepts a false match or rejects a legitimate signature, while protecting real voters' signatures and personal data. We should know how a defense performs before relying on it.
Make technology earn its place.
I support carefully tested AI assistance with repetitive election administration. It could reduce processing time and costs, freeing election staff to focus on exceptions and work that requires judgment. The results should be measured rather than assumed.
Before expanding a system, publish its accuracy, error rates, processing time, total costs, and independent audit results. Compare those results with the existing process. Keep accountable human oversight, paper evidence, meaningful audits, and protections for voter privacy.
Washington already permits automated initial signature review using a system approved by the secretary of state. When that system does not accept a signature, the county auditor must use the manual review process in the rule. That existing authority is a starting point for evaluating what works and where safeguards need improvement.
Give the public evidence it can examine.
Public confidence should rest on independently verifiable evidence, not assurances from officials or vendors.
Make procedures, testing standards, measured results, and audit findings accessible and understandable. Explain how errors are detected, reviewed, and corrected, and who is responsible for those decisions.
Public oversight can be rigorous while personal ballots, signatures, and identifying data remain protected. Transparency should show how the process works and how its results are checked.
Protect the voter. Make the process verifiable. Use technology where it proves its value.
A separate long-term proposal: The Sacred Ballot.
The Sacred Ballot explores a different election system involving witnessed voting, encrypted records, and distributed stewardship. It is a long-term experimental proposal with unresolved questions and substantial legal changes required before official use.
It proposes a departure from today's secret ballot, including witnesses who would know the voter's choices and eventual disclosure of individual records. Its distinct privacy questions and technical limits are explained on the proposal page.
Current-law background: RCW 29A.40.130 โ public access to ballot participation records; WAC 434-261-052 โ initial and secondary signature review. Reviewed November 1, 2026. These sources describe current Washington law and rules; the participation-list restriction above is a proposed change.